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Abstract. We propose a new approach to commutative watermarking-
encryption (CWE). A permutation cipher is used to encrypt the mul-
timedia data, which leaves the global statistics of the multimedia data
intact. Therefore, any non-localized watermarking scheme that depends
only on global statistics of the multimedia data can be combined with
the permutation cipher to form a CWE scheme. We demonstrate this
approach by giving a concrete implementation, which manipulates the
global histogram to achieve watermark embedding/detection.
1 Introduction
Encryption and watermarking are both important tools in protecting digital
contents, e.g. in digital rights management (DRM) systems. While encryption
is used to protect the contents from unauthorized access, watermarking can be
deployed for various purposes, ranging from ensuring authenticity of content to
embedding metadata, e.g. copyright or authorship information, into the contents.
The concept of commutative watermarking-encryption (CWE) was discussed
in [1] with special emphasis on watermarking in encrypted domain. Four prop-
erties about watermarking in encrypted domain are formulated in [1, Sec. 2.2]:
– Property 1. The marking function M can be performed on an encrypted
image.
– Property 2. The verification function V is able to reconstruct a mark in
the encrypted domain when it has been embedded in the encrypted domain.
– Property 3. The verification function V is able to reconstruct a mark in
the encrypted domain when it has been embedded in the clear domain.
– Property 4. The decryption function does not affect the integrity of the
watermark.
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As is pointed out in [1], Properties 2 and 3 are equivalent, if the encryption
function E and the marking function M commute, that is,
M(EK(I),m) = EK(M(I,m)) (1)
where E is the encryption function, K is the encryption key, I is the plaintext
media data and m is the mark to be embedded.
Previous approaches to CWE are essentially based on one of the following two
techniques: Homomorphic Encryption, where the encryption function is commu-
tative to some basic arithmetic operations like addition or multiplication that can
support a further watermarking step, or Partial Encryption, where only a part
of the multimedia data is encrypted and the remaining data are watermarked.
In the present contribution we propose a novel approach, namely to use a cipher
in the sense that it encrypts the multimedia data fully but leaves some global
properties untouched which are then used to embed the watermark. As a proof
of concept of this new approach, we propose a CWE scheme for digital images
by combining a permutation based cipher and a “non-localized” watermarking
scheme working with the global image histogram in the spatial domain.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Previous work on CWE, histogram-
based watermarking and joint encryption-watermarking are reviewed in Sec. 2.
In Sec. 3 we describe our proposed CWE framework in greater detail. In Secs. 4
and 5 we analyze the security and computational complexity of our proposed
CWE scheme. In Sec. 6 we show some experimental results. We conclude the
paper in Sec. 7, where we also give some directions for further research.
2 Related Work
2.1 Commutative Watermarking-Encryption
One approach to commutative watermarking is provided by deploying homo-
morphic encryption techniques so that some basic algebraic operations such as
addition and multiplication on the plaintexts can be transferred onto the cor-
responding ciphertexts, i.e., they are transparent to encryption [1, Sec. 2.1].
Especially, if both the encryption and the watermarking process consist of the
same homomorphic operation, one gets a commutative watermarking-encryption
scheme. Examples of homomorphic operations are exponentiation modulo n,
multiplication modulo n and addition modulo n (including the bitwise XOR op-
eration). One major drawback of this approach is the influence of encryption on
robustness of the watermarking algorithm: After strong encryption there is no
visual information available for the watermark embedder to adapt itself to in
order to increase robustness while at the same time minimizing visual quality
degradation [2, Sec. 9.4]. Another drawback is that the modular addition oper-
ation may cause overflow/underflow pixels that have to be handled separately,
thus making the system “quasi-commutative” [3]. The XOR operation does not
suffer from the overflow/underflow problem, though.
In partial encryption schemes, the plaintext multimedia data is partitioned
into two disjoint parts, where one part is encrypted and the other part is wa-
termarked. Since the encryption part is independent of the watermarking part,
they are naturally commutative. To take a typical example, in [4], the multimedia
data is partitioned into two parts after a four-level discrete wavelet transforma-
tion. The lowest-level coefficients are fully encrypted, while in the medium- and
high-level coefficients only the signs are encrypted. In this case, the unencrypted
absolute values of medium-level coefficients can be watermarked either before
or after encryption (if after, without access to the encryption key). However,
there is a certain danger that an attacker might tamper with the encrypted,
un-watermarked part. Depending on the encryption algorithm used, this might
go unnoticed by the recipient.
Because there is some information leakage through the unencrypted parts,
in order to get a high level of perceptual security, the data parts which are sig-
nificant for perception are encrypted, while only the perceptually unimportant
parts are watermarked, leaving the door open for an attacker trying to remove
the watermark. In order to overcome these difficulties, in another recent pro-
posal [5], a key-dependent transform domain, the Fibonacci-Haar transform, is
used for both watermarking and encryption to increase protection for the un-
encrypted, watermarked part. After a first-order Fibonacci-Haar transform, the
LL subband of each color component is fully encrypted. The remaining detail
subbands are then watermarked. The main drawback of this approach is that
neither decryption nor watermark detection is possible without knowledge of the
key for the Fibonacci-Haar transform, which means that Property 3 cannot be
fulfilled. Thus, by adding another layer of encryption, the original commutativ-
ity property of watermarking and encryption is lost. We call such schemes joint
watermarking-encryption (JWE) to differentiate them from CWE schemes.
Thus, for both approaches to CWE there is a lack of robustness against ma-
licious attacks, if strong encryption is used. This seems to be a general problem
with CWE schemes (see also Sec. 4.1).
2.2 Asymmetric Joint Watermarking-Encryption
A very interesting approach is put forward in [6], where a permutation-based
cipher is combined with an additive watermarking scheme acting on the 25× 25
upper left corner of the DCT coefficients of an image. This scheme is truly asym-
metric in the sense that different keys are used for embedding and detection of
the watermark. Detection of the watermark in the encrypted domain is possi-
ble because the public key D used for detection contains some side information
on the watermarked feature ψ and the encrypted watermarked feature ξ. This
scheme is not a CWE scheme, however, because the watermark detection requires
information on the encryption process.
2.3 Histogram Based Information Hiding
In [7] it is shown how a reversible information hiding scheme can be built by
hiding data within the histogram of an image. The basic idea is to shift the grey
levels of all pixels having a grey level between gmin and gmax towards gmin, where
gmin and gmax denote the grey level with the lowest and the highest heights in the
histogram, respectively. Such a shift will make the histogram bin at the position
gmax + 1 or gmax − 1 empty, thus “making space” for the data to be hidden.
2.4 Histogram Based Watermarking Schemes
The most widely studied approach to histogram based watermarking is so-called
exact histogram specification [8–11], where the histogram of the original image or
a (randomly and secretly selected) sub-region of it is modified toward a target
histogram, which is then used as the signature for watermark detection. The
histogram is not limited to be the one built from pixel values, but can also be a
2-D or 3-D histogram built from other features of the image [9–11]. To minimize
visual quality distortion caused by the histogram manipulation, an optimization
model can be used to find a globally optimum solution as demonstrated in [10].
However, most histogram based information hiding schemes cannot be used
for secret watermarking because they do not involve a secret embedding/detection
key. In what follows, we describe one approach that does use a secret watermark-
ing key and whose basic principle is used in the example implementation of our
proposed CWE framework.
The scheme proposed by Chrysochos et al. [12] is based on the idea of (se-
lectively) swapping two selected neighboring histogram bins a and b so that a
message bit is encoded by the heights of the two bins (denoted by hist(a) and
hist(b)): a 1-bit is encoded by hist(a) > hist(b) and a 0-bit by hist(a) < hist(b).
Here, swapping two histogram bins a and b means changing all pixel values a to
b and vice versa. In order to embed an N -bit watermark into a 8-bit grey-level
image, a watermarking key composed of a bin distance 1 ≤ step ≤ 9 and a
start bin index 0 ≤ a1 ≤ 255 − step is needed. The i-th bin pair is selected by
increasing a1 by i but skipping those bin pairs breaking at the right boundary
of the histogram. As the pixel values are changed by an amount of step when
embedding the watermark, the step is upper bounded to nine in order to limit
visual quality degradation. The embedding capacity of the scheme depends on
the number of candidate histogram bin pairs whose heights are not equal (which
is dependent on the image and the step), but it is bounded by 128 bits for 8-
bit grey-level images and 384 bits for RGB images. Besides these low capacity
bounds, the main problem of this scheme is the very small key space, which
contains only
∑9
step=1(256− step) = 2259 different watermarking keys.
3 The Proposed CWE Framework
In order to design a CWE scheme, the encryption/decryption function must
keep some features of the original image free from distortion so that they can be
used for watermark embedding either before or after encryption. For instance,
homomorphic encryption preserves the locations of all pixels so that the wa-
termark embedding process can still happen on the intended pixels as long as
the embedding function is commutative to the encryption function. Partial en-
cryption preserves both locations and pixel values of part of an image so that
watermark embedding can happen without any constraints. Neither of the ex-
isting approaches to CWE tries to preserve pixel values and distorts locations of
all pixels. This led us to propose a third approach for designing a CWE scheme:
using a permutation cipher to encrypt the image to preserve all pixel values in-
tact for watermarking embedding. What a permutation cipher does is to simply
shuﬄe the locations of all pixels under the control of a secret key. Although no
change is made to any pixel value, the ciphertext image normally looks random
enough to achieve the goal of concealing almost all visual information carried
by the original image. Since no pixel value is changed by a permutation cipher,
the global histogram of the image remains intact. If a watermarking scheme
only uses the global histogram of the image for embedding and detection, which
we call non-localized watermarking, the permutation (as an encryption function)
and the watermarking processes will become commutative, satisfying all the four
properties listed in Sec. 1. Examples include the image watermarking schemes
proposed in [10, 12] and the video watermarking scheme proposed in [13]. The
last scheme makes use of both the spatial histograms of single frames and the
temporal histogram for a given video sequence.
An obvious advantage of this new approach is that the robustness of the
watermarking algorithm remains intact because all information (global statistics)
required by the algorithm is not changed by encryption. In this aspect, the new
approach outperforms the homomorphic cryptography based CWE approach.
Compared with the partial encryption based approach, our proposed scheme
can provide a higher level of security since total encryption is applied here.
3.1 Watermarking Part
The watermarking part is designed following the basic principle of the histogram
based watermarking scheme proposed in [12]. However, since this scheme suffers
from two severe limitations, namely a very small key space and a small capacity,
we have devised a modified watermarking scheme to overcome both problems.
Basic Scheme For embedding the watermark, we select each bin pair randomly
from all remaining candidates rather than in a sequential order as in the original
scheme [12], which leads to a significantly bigger key space. The process is driven
by a stream cipher that serves as a secret pseudo-random number generator. The
watermark is encrypted so that the order of selected bin pairs matters in the
extraction of the watermark. Given an N -bit watermark, the bin pairs selection,
watermark embedding and detection processes can be described as follows.
Bin pairs selection: For the i-th bin pair, run the stream cipher to create a
random integer 0 ≤ x ≤ 255− 2i. Then pick the x-th unused bin as the first bin
ai. Then, run the stream cipher to create a new integer max(−9,−ai) ≤ step ≤
min(255− ai, 9). Pick the (ai + step)-th bin as the second bin bi. If bi has been
used or if the two bins have the same height, re-generate a new integer x and a
new step until two valid bins are selected to form a new bin pair.
Watermark embedding: First encrypt the watermark W = {wi}Ni=1 by the
stream cipher to get W ∗ = {w∗i }Ni=1. The heights of the two selected bin pairs
ai and bi should encode w
∗
i as follows: if w
∗
i = 1, hist(ai) < hist(bi) should hold,
and if w∗i = 0, hist(ai) > hist(bi) should hold, where hist(x) denotes the height
of the bin x. If this is not the case, the two bins ai and bi are swapped.
Watermark extraction: First, reconstruct the same sequence of bin pairs
{ai, bi}Ni=1 at the detector side. Then, extract the encrypted watermark as fol-
lows: W ∗ = {w∗i }Ni=1, where w∗i = 0 if hist(ai) > hist(bi) and w∗i = 1 if
hist(ai) < hist(bi). Finally, decrypt W
∗ to recover the plaintext watermark W .
Figure 1 shows the results of embedding a 64-bit watermark “12345678” into
the blue channel of the test image “baboon” by using the modified watermarking
scheme and by the original watermarking scheme.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 1: Embedding a 64-bit watermark “12345678” into an image’s blue channel:
(a) original image; (b) image watermarked by the modified scheme (PSNR =
42.57); (c) image watermarked by the original scheme (PSNR = 42.36).
We ran both watermarking schemes on the Kodak true-color image database
and measured the quality of the watermarked images by using ten objective
visual quality assessment (VQA) metrics included in the MeTriX MuX VQA
Package [14]. The results show that our changes to the original scheme does not
compromise the visual quality of the watermarked image. To be more exact,
the mean of the visual quality measured by all the ten VQA metrics remains
similar for both schemes but our scheme seems to have a smaller variance in the
measured visual quality, which can be partly explained by the stronger random
effect of the bin selection process. Figure 2 shows the PSNR and SSIM (two
VQA metrics) values of 24 images watermarked by the two schemes.
Enhancing the Capacity The capacity of the basic scheme described above
is limited to the number of candidate bin pairs, which is upper bounded by 128
bits. It can be greatly enhanced by dividing the cover work into sub-images and
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Fig. 2: Visual quality comparison of the modified watermarking scheme and the
original one, measured by PSNR and SSIM.
applying the basic scheme to those sub-images independently. In order to keep
the visual distortions at a level comparable to that of the basic scheme, the sub-
images should have roughly similar histogram shapes as the underlying image.
This can be achieved either by randomly assigning image pixels to sub-images
or by doing this using a predefined fixed pattern, where each pixel in an n×m
block is assigned to one of n×m sub-images. Both approaches yield histograms
similar to the original one. For simplicity reasons, we chose the latter approach in
our prototype implementation. More specifically, for a pixel p(i, j) in the original
image I, we compute k = i mod n and ` = j mod m and assign p(i, j) to sub-
image S(k, `). Figure 3 shows one resulting sub-image and the corresponding
histograms for the blue channel of the baboon image in the case n = m = 8.
The maximum capacity achievable by this approach depends on the size of the
sub-images. For our prototype, we chose the sub-images to be s×s images, where
s is a common divisor of width W and height H of the underlying image. This
choice was motivated by our use of Arnold’s cat Map for encrypting the image
(see Sec. 3.2), but in principle non-square sub-images are also possible. Moreover,
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 3: Splitting the cover work into 64 parts: (a) a sub-image; (b) histogram of
the original image; (c) histogram of the sub-image (a).
the sub-image size does not need to be a divisor of W and H. In the most general
case, the maximum capacity per colour channel is Cmax(P ) = 128·bWH/P c bits,
where P is the number of pixels in one sub-image.
In our prototype implementation, we set s ≥ 50 to ensure a meaningful
histogram of each sub-image. Thus, here the overall maximum capacity is Cmax =
128 · bWH/s2c bits per colour channel, where s is the smallest common divisor
of W and H that is ≥ 50. See Table 2 for some experimental results.
3.2 Encryption Part
Permutation ciphers have been very popular in securing analog Pay-TV ser-
vices [15] and digital multimedia data in general [16] because they can be easily
implemented and perceptual information about the ciphertext can be effectively
concealed. A permutation cipher acting on an W ×H image can be modeled by
a W ×H permutation matrix M = {m(x, y) = (x′, y′)} 0≤x,x′≤W−1
0≤y,y′≤H−1
, where (i′, j′)
denotes the new location of the pixel (i, j) after permutation [17, Sec. 2].
Note that the same permutation matrix can be used for encryption and
decryption because the permutation is always a bijection. In principle, one can
use the permutation matrix as the secret key, however, which occupies too much
space so that the key management becomes difficult. A common practice is to
use an algorithm to generate a permutation matrix under the control of a few
parameters, which are used as the secret key. One of the simplest algorithms
is as follows: generate a sequence of WH random numbers, then sort them,
and finally take the 1-D indices which can be converted into 2-D coordinates to
form the permutation matrix. Here, the random sequence can be generated by
a stream cipher so that the permutation matrix is secret. The main drawback
of this simple algorithm is about its complexity: the average complexity of a
fast sorting algorithm is O(WH log2(WH)) and the worst-case complexity is
O((WH)2) [18]. While the complexity is actually not very high, when WH is
large, the factor log2(WH) can still be significant. For instance, for full HD
videos log2(WH) = log2(1920× 1080) ≈ 21.
Many researchers have suggested iterating a parameterized 2-D discrete map
to generate the permutation matrix. The average and worst-case complexities of
such an approach is both O(nWH), where n is the number of iterations. If the
image size is known in advance, the permutation matrix in each iteration can be
pre-computed, thus leading to a reduced computational complexity of O(WH).
For our prototype implementation of the proposed CWE framework, we
choose Arnold’s cat map [19], which was used by several researchers for en-
crypting square images [20, 21]. Non-square images have to be either padded to
be a square image or decomposed into a union of smaller square sub-images, like
we did in the enhanced watermarking scheme described in Sec. 3.1. Arnold’s cat
map in its original form is defined on the unit square by(
xi+1
yi+1
)
=
(
1 1
1 2
)
·
(
xi
yi
)
mod 1, (2)
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 4: Encryption results of the permutation cipher based on Arnold’s cat map:
(a) and (c) plain images; (b) and (d) ciphered images.
where “mod 1” means taking the fractional part of the argument.
Given an H ×H image, one discretized version [21] is defined as follows:(
xi+1
yi+1
)
=
(
1 a
b ab+ 1
)
·
(
xi
yi
)
mod H, (3)
where a and b are parameters that can serve as the secret key if the function is
used for encryption purposes. Figure 4 shows the results of applying Arnold’s
cat map to the test images “baboon” and “parrots”, respectively. The baboon
image was encrypted in its original form, while the parrots image was subdivided
into 2× 3 square sub-images before encryption. After that, each sub-image was
encrypted using a different key.
3.3 Optional Information Hiding Part
Histogram based data hiding schemes like the one in [7] are localized due to
the need of bookkeeping the locations of some pixels, therefore, they cannot be
used for watermarking in the context of our applications. However, they may
still be used for the encryption part, e.g. to transport part of the key and other
meta-information needed for the decryption process (cf. Sec. 4.2).
4 Security Analysis
As the watermarking and encryption schemes deployed are completely indepen-
dent, they do not interfere with each other and their security can be assessed
separately. Further, we can restrict our analysis to the basic scheme, as the
sub-images are watermarked and encrypted independently from each other.
4.1 Watermarking Part
Unauthorized Embedding and Detection The watermarking scheme de-
scribed in Sec. 3.1 is driven by a stream cipher selecting the candidate histogram
bin pairs for embedding. The number of all possible selections of different bin
pairs, denoted by S(N), depends on N , the length of the embedded watermark
W . The size of the key space is therefore min(2|K|, S(N)), where K is the key
of the stream cipher and |K| is the its bit size.
In this subsection we derive two lower bounds on S(N), which correspond to
two different ranges of the length of embedded watermark N . To simplify our
discussion, we assume W is a sequence of bits W = b0b1 . . . bN−1, where N ≥ 8.
1. Case 1: 8 ≤ N < 20. Since S(N1) < S(N2) if N1 < N2, we calculate the
lower bound for N = 8. We limit ourselves to those histogram bins with 18
neighbors to make our calculation easier. There are 256-18 such bins. After
having embedded i watermark bits, 2i bins have already been used. Likewise,
at most 2i bins in the neighborhood of the first selected bin for embedding
bi+1 are occupied by previously selected bins. Combining these two facts, we
immediately have the following lower bound:
S(N) >
∏7
i=0
((256− 18)− 2i)× (18− 2i)) ≈ 289. (4)
2. Case 2: 20 ≤ N ≤ 128. A lower bound can be obtained by considering only
a subset of all the possible keys. A simple subset can be obtained as follows
(without loss of generality, assuming 256 can be divided by N): partition all
the 256 bins into N disjoint parts of equal size 256/N , then randomly select a
permutation of the N parts, and finally randomly pick two bins in each part
whose distance is not greater than nine grey levels. Since in each part the
number of bins may be smaller than nine, there are
(
256
N ·min
(
9, 256N − 1
))
possibilities for each part. Thus, we get the following lower bound:
S(N) > N ! ·
(
256
N
·min
(
9,
256
N
− 1
))N
. (5)
For N = 32, the lower bound is already well beyond 200 bits key length.
Unauthorized Removal Unfortunately, the watermark cannot withstand a
malicious attacker manipulating the image histogram. The watermark may be
removed by either randomly swapping neighbouring histogram bins or shifting
the whole histogram by a small amount. This problem seems unavoidable since
such attacks can simply resemble the original embedding algorithm.
Robustness Histogram based watermarks are known to be resistant against
geometric attacks since the histogram is largely invariant to geometric transfor-
mations. More precisely, according to [22], the histogram is preserved by image
transformations Ψt : D → R2, where D ⊂ R2 is the domain of the image and
t ∈ R is the parameter of the transformation, with the property div ( ddtΨt) = 0.
When working in the encrypted domain, most signal processing operations
can be ruled out in the robustness discussion, as the resulting image cannot be
decrypted anymore. However, images encrypted by a permutation cipher can
be lossily compressed [23]. Robustness against this kind of compression will be
subject of further research.
4.2 Encryption Part
It is well known that pure permutation-based ciphers are vulnerable to known-
and chosen-plaintext attacks. A quantitative study was reported in [17], where
it is shown that for an H × H square image with L grey levels O(logLH2)
known plaintexts are sufficient to recover half of the plaintext pixels. The com-
putational complexity of these attacks is O(p · H4), where p is the number of
known ciphertexts used, making these attacks practical. Therefore, we propose
to use image-varying keys, e.g. image-dependent keys derived from the (normal
or visual) hash of the image. The key is divided into one long-term secret mas-
ter key and one short-term public image-dependent session key. The latter can
be embedded into the encrypted image by using a reversible information hiding
scheme such as those described in Sec. 2.3. It is combined with the secret master
key to form the key for decrypting the image.
Arnold’s cat map used in our prototype implementation suffers from a small
key space of H2, if the same parameters are used for all iterations. In addition, it
is well known that any discrete area-preserving map is periodic (upper bounded
by the total number of finite states) and the discrete cat map applied to binary
images has a period upper bounded by 3H [24]. For some “bad” parameters, the
period can be very short. For example, selecting a = 40, b = 8 yields the original
image again after five iterations if H = 124 [25].
The security problems with Arnold’s cat map can be mitigated by using
different keys for different iterations, which can increase the key space to H2n
and also reduce the influence of bad parameters on the final result. We generated
1000 random keys with parameters H = 124 and n = 20, and none of the
generated permutation matrix degenerates to the identity matrix. This led us to
believe that the combination of n different keys is strong enough for our purpose.
If the sorting based approach mentioned in Sec 3.2 is used to generate a
random permutation matrix, the security problems with Arnold’s cat map will
disappear. In this case, the key space becomes (H2)! and the short period does
not exist anymore since we stop depending on iterating a 2-D map repeatedly.
5 Complexity Analysis
Without loss of generality, we assume that the plaintext image is an H × H
image with L grey levels, that the watermark is an N -bit pattern, and that N
is much smaller than H2, so that the derived complexity can be more compact.
As in Sec. 4, we restrict the analysis to the basic scheme with no sub-images.
In addition, we only consider the average complexity because the worst-case
complexity can be quite different and less meaningful.
5.1 Watermarking Complexity
Generating the histogram corresponds to H2 operations. To select N bin pairs
from the histogram, ≈ 2N operations are needed. To embed all the N bits, aver-
agely N/2 bin pairs need swapping, whose complexity is NH2/L. To detect the
watermark, only N comparisons of bin heights are needed. To sum up, the overall
computational complexity of the watermark embedding process is O(NH2/L)
and that of the watermark detection process is O(H2).
5.2 Encryption/Decryption Complexity
Since any permutation cipher can be represented by an H × H permutation
matrix, encrypting an image requires merely H2 look-up table operations and
H2 assignments. Iterating the discrete 2-D cat map n times requires nH2 look-up
table operations and pixel value assignments. Generating the permutation matrix
requires 3H2 multiplications and 3H2 addition/assignments. We can ignore the
3H2 additions/assignments, because multiplications are computationally much
heavier. Thus, the overall complexity becomes O((n+ 5)H2) = O(nH2). When
the sorting based approach is used to generate the permutation matrix, the
overall complexity is O(log2(H)H
2). Since the decryption can be done by using
the same matrix, the computational complexity remains the same.
5.3 Comparison with Existing Schemes
Table 1 shows the complexities of our proposed CWE scheme and some existing
ones following the other two approaches to CWE.
6 Experimental Results
Table 2 shows the results of applying the proposed CWE scheme including subdi-
vision into square sub-images to four test images. By design, the watermarked-
encrypted image and the encrypted-watermarked image are the same. In all
images, a random bit sequence of maximum length was embedded into the blue
channel. The PSNR and SSIM values were calculated by comparing the blue
channels of the cover work and the marked image.
Table 1: Complexities of our CWE proposed scheme and some existing ones.
Scheme
Watermarking
embedding complexity
Watermarking
detection complexity
Encryption
complexity
Proposed CWE scheme* O((N/L+ 1)H2) O(H2) O(nH2)
Homomorphic CWE
schemes in [2, Sec. 9.3]
O(H2) O(H2) O(H2)
Partial encryption based
CWE scheme in [4]**
O(mH2) O(mH2) O(mH2)
*: n is the number of iterations of the cat map.
**: m denotes the length of the low-pass and high-pass wavelet filters.
Table 2: Some experimental results.
Plain Image I
Cmax
n×m*
Marked Image
M(I,m)
PSNR
SSIM
EK(M(I,m)) =
M(EK(I),m)
8192
8× 8
36.69
0.966
8192
8× 8
36.56
0.913
12288
8× 12
36.45
0.876
*: n×m denotes the size of the sub-image array
The watermark could be successfully extracted either from the encrypted
marked image EK(M(I,m)) (Property 3) or from the marked encrypted im-
age M(EK(I),m) (Property 2). In all cases, decrypting either M(EK(I),m) or
EK(M(I,m)) leads to the marked plaintext image M(I,m), from which the
watermark could still be successfully extracted (Property 4).
7 Conclusion and Further Work
We have presented a novel approach to building commutative watermarking-
encryption schemes based on permutation-only ciphers and non-localized wa-
termarking schemes. A concrete CWE scheme was designed by combining a
histogram based watermarking scheme with a permutation cipher based on a
discrete 2-D chaotic map. It satisfies all the four properties formulated in [1].
Due to its simplicity, the proposed scheme is well suited for applications with
high performance requirements, such as video content protection or authenticity
of large amounts of encrypted transcoded data in heterogenous networks.
In our future work, we will study a possible generalization of the proposed
CWE scheme to compressed domain, where the key questions include how to ap-
ply permutations without compromising compression efficiency and how to make
the watermarking scheme more robust to lossy compression. We will also investi-
gate if reversible CWE schemes can be designed within the proposed framework.
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